The Tradeoff That Wasn’t

In the 1960s, macroeconomics had a comforting story: governments could choose their preferred combination of inflation and unemployment. Want less unemployment? Just accept a bit more inflation. The Phillips curve — an observed inverse relationship between inflation and unemployment — seemed to offer policymakers a permanent menu of options.

Edmund Phelps blew this up. He showed that the tradeoff is an illusion — it works temporarily, but trying to exploit it permanently leads to ever-accelerating inflation with no lasting reduction in unemployment. This insight, developed independently but along similar lines by Milton Friedman, transformed macroeconomic theory and policy.


The Expectations-Augmented Phillips Curve

The original Phillips curve said: low unemployment causes high inflation, and vice versa. Phelps asked a devastating question: what happens when people start expecting inflation?

The logic:

  • Suppose the government stimulates the economy to push unemployment below its “natural” level
  • Initially, this works — firms hire more workers, output rises, and inflation increases
  • But workers and firms aren’t stupid. They notice prices rising and adjust their expectations. Workers demand higher wages to compensate for expected inflation. Firms raise prices to cover higher wage costs
  • Now the same level of unemployment produces higher inflation than before — because expected inflation has risen
  • To keep unemployment low, the government must create even more inflation — more than people expect. But expectations adjust again, requiring still more inflation
  • The result: accelerating inflation with unemployment eventually returning to its natural rate

This is the expectations-augmented Phillips curve: the short-run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment depends on the gap between actual and expected inflation. In the long run, when expectations catch up to reality, there is no tradeoff at all. The long-run Phillips curve is vertical at the natural rate of unemployment.

The Natural Rate of Unemployment

Phelps introduced the concept of the natural rate of unemployment — the unemployment rate that prevails when inflation is stable (neither accelerating nor decelerating). This isn’t zero, because some unemployment is structural:

  • Workers searching for better jobs (frictional unemployment)
  • Mismatches between workers’ skills and available jobs (structural unemployment)
  • Wage rigidities from unions, minimum wages, or efficiency wage considerations

The natural rate isn’t “natural” in the sense of being optimal or unchangeable — it depends on labor market institutions, regulations, and policies. But it cannot be permanently reduced by monetary or fiscal stimulus. Attempts to push unemployment below the natural rate through demand management only produce inflation.

This had profound policy implications:

  • Central banks cannot target unemployment directly — they can only control inflation in the long run
  • The stagflation of the 1970s — simultaneous high inflation and high unemployment — was exactly what Phelps’s theory predicted would happen when governments tried to exploit the Phillips curve
  • Credibility matters — if people expect the central bank to tolerate inflation, the short-run tradeoff worsens. If they trust the bank to fight inflation, the tradeoff improves

The Golden Rule of Capital Accumulation

Before his work on inflation and unemployment, Phelps made a fundamental contribution to growth theory. He asked: how much should a society save?

The golden rule of capital accumulation (1961): there is an optimal savings rate that maximizes consumption per person in the long run. Save too little, and the economy has too little capital to produce efficiently. Save too much, and people sacrifice current consumption for capital that yields diminishing returns.

The golden rule savings rate is where the marginal product of capital equals the rate of economic growth. This elegant result provided a benchmark for evaluating whether economies are saving too much or too little — and influenced debates about pension systems, public investment, and intergenerational fairness.

Microeconomic Foundations of Unemployment

Phelps didn’t just describe the natural rate — he explained it from the ground up. In his “island economy” models and the landmark Microeconomic Foundations of Employment and Inflation Theory (1970), he built unemployment from individual decisions:

  • Search and matching: Workers don’t know all available jobs; they must search. Firms don’t know all available workers; they must recruit. This search process takes time, generating unemployment even in a healthy economy
  • Wage setting under imperfect information: Firms set wages without knowing exactly what other firms are paying. Each firm faces a tradeoff — higher wages attract better workers but cost more. The aggregate result of these individual decisions determines the natural rate
  • Efficiency wages: Firms may pay above-market wages to motivate workers, reduce turnover, or attract talent — creating involuntary unemployment as a byproduct

These microfoundations connected macroeconomic outcomes to individual behavior — a methodological advance that influenced the entire field.

His 2006 Nobel Prize was awarded “for his analysis of intertemporal tradeoffs in macroeconomic policy.”


Explain It to a Child

Imagine your teacher says: “If you all talk quietly, I’ll give you extra recess.” At first it works — everyone whispers and gets extra playtime. But soon kids figure out the trick and start talking louder, knowing extra recess is coming anyway. Now the teacher has to promise even MORE recess to keep things quiet, but kids keep adjusting. Eventually, you have tons of promised recess but the classroom is just as noisy as before. That’s what Phelps discovered about inflation and unemployment: the government can trick people into working more by creating surprise inflation, but once people catch on and expect it, the trick stops working. You end up with high inflation and the same unemployment you started with.

不存在的权衡

1960年代,宏观经济学有一个令人安慰的故事:政府可以选择通胀和失业的偏好组合。想要更少的失业?只需接受多一点通胀。菲利普斯曲线——观察到的通胀与失业之间的反向关系——似乎为政策制定者提供了一个永久的选项菜单。

菲尔普斯炸毁了这一切。他证明这种权衡是幻觉——它暂时有效,但试图永久利用它会导致不断加速的通胀,而失业却没有持久减少。这一洞见与弗里德曼独立但沿着类似思路发展,改变了宏观经济理论和政策。


预期增强的菲利普斯曲线

原始菲利普斯曲线说:低失业导致高通胀,反之亦然。菲尔普斯提出了一个毁灭性的问题:当人们开始预期通胀时会发生什么?

逻辑:

  • 假设政府刺激经济,将失业率推到”自然”水平以下
  • 最初这有效——企业雇用更多工人,产出上升,通胀增加
  • 但工人和企业不傻。他们注意到价格上涨并调整预期。工人要求更高的工资来补偿预期通胀。企业提高价格以覆盖更高的工资成本
  • 现在同样的失业水平产生了比以前更高的通胀——因为预期通胀已经上升
  • 要保持低失业,政府必须制造更多通胀——超过人们的预期。但预期再次调整,需要更多通胀
  • 结果:加速的通胀,失业最终回到自然率

这就是预期增强的菲利普斯曲线:通胀与失业之间的短期权衡取决于实际通胀与预期通胀之间的差距。长期来看,当预期赶上现实时,根本没有权衡。长期菲利普斯曲线在自然失业率处是垂直的。

自然失业率

菲尔普斯引入了自然失业率的概念——通胀稳定(既不加速也不减速)时的失业率。这不是零,因为一些失业是结构性的:

  • 工人寻找更好的工作(摩擦性失业)
  • 工人技能与可用工作之间的不匹配(结构性失业)
  • 工会、最低工资或效率工资考虑造成的工资刚性

自然率不是”自然”意义上的最优或不可改变——它取决于劳动市场制度、法规和政策。但它不能通过货币或财政刺激永久降低。试图通过需求管理将失业推到自然率以下只会产生通胀。

这有深远的政策含义:

  • 央行不能直接以失业为目标——长期来看它们只能控制通胀
  • 1970年代的滞胀——同时出现的高通胀和高失业——正是菲尔普斯理论预测的政府试图利用菲利普斯曲线时会发生的情况
  • 信誉很重要——如果人们预期央行容忍通胀,短期权衡恶化。如果他们信任央行会对抗通胀,权衡改善

资本积累的黄金法则

在通胀和失业的工作之前,菲尔普斯对增长理论做出了基础性贡献。他问:一个社会应该储蓄多少?

资本积累的黄金法则(1961年):存在一个最优储蓄率,使长期人均消费最大化。储蓄太少,经济没有足够的资本来高效生产。储蓄太多,人们为收益递减的资本牺牲了当前消费。

黄金法则储蓄率是资本边际产出等于经济增长率的点。这一优雅的结果为评估经济是储蓄过多还是过少提供了基准——并影响了关于养老金制度、公共投资和代际公平的辩论。

失业的微观经济基础

菲尔普斯不仅描述了自然率——他从根本上解释了它。在他的”岛屿经济”模型和里程碑式的《就业与通胀理论的微观经济基础》(1970年)中,他从个体决策构建失业:

  • 搜寻与匹配:工人不知道所有可用的工作;他们必须搜寻。企业不知道所有可用的工人;他们必须招聘。这个搜寻过程需要时间,即使在健康的经济中也会产生失业
  • 不完全信息下的工资设定:企业在不确切知道其他企业支付多少的情况下设定工资。每家企业面临权衡——更高的工资吸引更好的工人但成本更高。这些个体决策的总体结果决定了自然率
  • 效率工资:企业可能支付高于市场的工资来激励工人、减少流动或吸引人才——作为副产品创造了非自愿失业

这些微观基础将宏观经济结果与个体行为联系起来——一项影响了整个领域的方法论进步。

他2006年的诺贝尔奖授奖词为:“因其对宏观经济政策跨期权衡的分析。“


讲给小孩听

想象你的老师说:“如果你们都小声说话,我就给你们额外的课间休息。“一开始有效——每个人都小声说话,得到了额外的玩耍时间。但很快孩子们发现了这个把戏,开始说话更大声,因为知道额外休息反正会来。现在老师必须承诺更多的休息来保持安静,但孩子们不断调整。最终,你有了大量承诺的休息时间,但教室和以前一样吵。这就是菲尔普斯关于通胀和失业的发现:政府可以通过制造意外通胀来欺骗人们多工作,但一旦人们识破并预期到它,把戏就不管用了。你最终得到的是高通胀和你开始时一样的失业率。


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